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In this paper the concept of the boundary of civilizations is discussed on the 
example of Polish-Belarusian and Polish-Ukrainian borderlands. The author 
starts from the assumption, shared by many historians and sociologists, that 
civilizations are real cultural entities based on certain long-lasting patterns of 
symbolical order. Those patterns are closely related to respective religions like 
Catholicism and Orthodoxy, but they act even though people’s religiosity is we-
ak. The differences between Western Christian and Eastern Christian patterns 
remain important in a secularized world as well. The author analyses how the-
se civilization differences influence both cross national and political identities 
in countries, situated on the boundary of civilizations. He shows, in particu-
lar, how symbolic patterns shape the identity of Catholic minority in modern 
Belarus and that of Orthodox minority in today’s Poland.  
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Introduction: the concept of civilization
The term “civilization” refers to the widest type of cultural and political common-
wealth. Each civilization is characterized by a certain scope of basic ideas and repre-
sentations that remains virtually unchanged in centuries. While defining religion as 
“symbolic universe” we will refer to these ideas and representations as religious ones. 
This wide definition, forged by Alfred Schütz (Schütz 1962), is used by some contem-
porary sociologists, e.g. by Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger. Luckman expresses 
it in the following passage: “Symbolic universes are socially objectified systems of 
meaning referring to the world of everyday life, as well as to the realm of otherworld 
transcending it” (Luckmann 1996: 77).
Berger’s understanding of the foregoing concept seems to be expressed in a similar 
way (Berger 1999). Accordingly, each civilization manifests itself both in a certain 
way of life and transcendence by which it is legitimized. This is the very source of 
its permanence as well, since any civilizational transformation brings about changes 
in the whole “symbolic universe”. Each partial conversion – economical, political or 
technological – uncoordinated with the system as a whole, has serious consequences 
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to every aspect of civilization, and threatens with civilizational crisis, disintegration 
of a human community, as well as personal degradation of individuals.
According to Ferdinand Braudel, a “long duration” is the main feature of civiliza-
tion. As he writes, “this resistance and acceptance, permanence and long, invisible 
changes bring us closer to the last definition that characterizes civilization by histori-
cal continuity and undetermined duration”. According to him, civilizations “survive 
political, social, economical or even ideological upheavals that are very often their 
in-built variations” (Braudel 1972: 302). 
Religion and civilization: the case of Eastern  
European border
The idea that religion is the source of civilization which is responsible for its identity 
and particularity is recognized by most of its theorists. This view is shared by Oswald 
Spengler, Arnold Toybeee, Max Weber, Feliks Koneczny, Samuel Huntington to name 
a few. Their ideas are well-known to modern readers, so I do not consider it necessary 
to present them here.
However, the very concept of religion seems to be problematic. The above-men-
tioned term of “symbolic universe” that refers to particular but permanent features 
of each religious tradition, appears to be more accurate. As it is seen from this stand-
point, religion, conceived as an institutionalized form of expression of meta-physical 
intuitions and rituals related to them, seems to be a declining, self-conscious phase 
of a long evolution of the “symbolic universe”. On the surface, religion as “symbolic 
universe” also has its history: it suffers repressions, changes, modifications and refor-
mations: it could also disappear from the public life (like in Mongolia, China, Albany, 
or even in the Soviet Union). However, when the situation changes, it resurrects in the 
same or a slightly modified form, as a manifestation of the same “symbolic universe”, 
the core of given civilization. Weber in his brilliant book on the Chinese civilization 
considers that the concept of “religion” is unfamiliar to Chinese people and there is no 
equivalent to that word in the ancient Chinese language. Chinese used different terms 
to describe: a) a doctrine of any “intellectual school”, b) rituals, both religious and just 
customary.
The difference between institutional religion and “symbolic universe” becomes 
clearer, when we trace the process of accommodation of Christianity in many coun-
tries of Asia, Africa or Latin America. The mission of Society of Jesus in China, 
headed by Matteo Ricci, could serve here as a symptomatic example. Ricci knew 
China, its language and culture very well, he adopted Christianity to it and created 
“Chinese rite”. Despite a small number of Jesuits engaged in the action, the order 
was very successful in Christianization of the Chinese (300 thousand people were 
baptized). However, in 1804 the pope Clement XI banned the Chinese Christianity 
as unorthodox because of some Daoist elements present in it. This decision stopped 
Christianization of China for more than a century. In our times similar accusation 
of “Chinizing” of Christianity was made against famous philosopher and theologian, 
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Anthony de Mello. Yet one must bear in mind that Buddhism also had to accommo-
date to Chinese “symbolic universe” and other ideologies nolens volens suffered the 
same fate. Then Maoism was a Chinese version of the Marxism-Leninism, which was 
itself the Russian version of the original Marxist ideology. The strength of the Russian 
“symbolic universe” is proved by the fact that 70 years of dominance of “scientific 
atheism” did nearly no harm to the Orthodox Church in Russia.
Let us focus on a much more familiar example of the area, situated on the Polish-
Ukrainian and the Polish-Belarusian border. People living there are identified mostly 
by their confessions, that is, by the civilizations they belong to. In this local context 
there are two types of such confessions/civilizations: Orthodox and Latin ones (esp. 
Catholicism). Speaking of religions, we do not refer here to various institutionalized 
churches. This remark is of great importance when we deal with Christian Orthodox 
confession. Orthodox religion is based on rituals and its doctrine is far less impor-
tant; Orthodox people do not care too much what they worship, but how they do that. 
Kosacks, who set their rebellions against Polish and Lithuanian nobility, named them-
selves “defenders of Orthodox faith”, despite disregarding of any orthodox institu-
tion or authority. Yet one cannot say that their “love for Orthodox church” lacked 
sincerity.
In 1994, I set out investigation on religiosity of Ukrainians, interviewing 2,242 
people. It appears that religiosity of Ukrainians is determined by their confession. 55% 
of Protestants regarded themselves as “deeply religious”, while only 25% of Catholics, 
16% of Greek-Catholics, 8% of Kiev Orthodox and 4% Moscow Orthodox did so. 
When we analyze data concerning religious practice, the same model of religiosity 
appears. 66% of Protestants frequented service at least once a week, while 32% of 
Greek-Catholics and only 2% of Moscow Orthodox did so. 30% of Moscow Orthodox 
stated that they never go to Mass. Only 34% of Orthodox regarded themselves as be-
lievers; others declared themselves as non-believers, seekers or even atheists.
From the point of view of official religion, the term “Orthodox non-believer” 
and, especially, “Orthodox atheist” makes no sense. Yet sociologists consider that 
Orthodoxy remains the essential feature of such people’s identity. 
The problem of national and civilization identity:  
the Catholics in Belarus
We can compare these data with the situation of Catholics in Belarus. According to 
the 1999 census, 395.7 thousand of Belarusian citizens declared themselves as Pol-
ish – that makes 4% of the whole population. However, this data does not reflect the 
very importance of the Polish minority in Belarusian politics not only “qualitatively”, 
but also quantitatively. The problem is that according to a common opinion, shared 
also by some Polish analytics, all Belarusian Catholics are Polish, but for many rea-
sons they do not want to declare their real nationality. Sociological survey carried 
out in 1997 shows that 10.4%, that is at least one million of Belarusian citizens, de-
clared themselves as Catholics. This number increases when we add “non-believers” 
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or “indifferent towards religion” from Catholic families. The census brings also very 
interesting data concerning linguistic preferences of Belarusians. 84.9% of Belarusian 
Polish living in villages, speak “Belarusian” at home, 9% of them speak “Ruthenian”. 
Among Belarusian city dwellers, declaring themselves as Polish, 34.6% speak Belaru-
sian at home, while 65.5% speak “Ruthenian”. Being asked what their native language 
is, 61% answered “Belarusian“.
As we see, ethnographers have not got on their disposal any criterion but confes-
sion. Empirical surveys confirm this hypothesis. Ann Engelking, who investigated the 
region of Grodno, writes: “Researcher asking people about differences between Polish 
and Belarusians in Belarus can hear only on similarities: No, no, all the same but 
confession, the rest is the same. The same kolkhoz, the same life... Or: Now there is 
equality <…> There are many Belarusians and ‘Ruski’, and all we speak to them in 
Belarusian... We are like brothers and sisters...” (Engelking 1999: 208). 
“He cares about people, about their life. Listen, young lady, without Łukaszenka 
all kolkhozes would fall apart, and disorder would be, and the land wouldn’t be culti-
vated, and hunger would be. Thanks to him we still have kolkhoz, and something to 
eat, and warm place to sleep, everything is done. In Lithuania there is no kolkhoz and 
they live in chaos...” (Engelking 1999: 209). 
“Kolkhoz must be” – for majority of Belarusians it is the universal truth. Only one 
from 400 interviewed people wanted kolkhozes to be cancelled. Kolkhoznicks, who 
each 6th January write on doors “K + M + B”, explains this inscription (which was 
linked by tradition with the names of Three Kings: Kacper, Melchior, Baltazar) as 
“Kolkhoz Must Be”. Of course, it is a joke, but also a signum tempori. “When kolkhoz 
would fall apart – we read in an interview – the people would be suffering. Man 
cannot live alone. He prefers to live in kolkhoz. In kolkhoz it is much better to him” 
(Engelking 1999: 210). 
Then what happens, when these Belarusian kolkhoznicks, who consider them-
selves to be Polish, move to cities and become teachers, engineers or clerks? Some 
of them join cultural and political organizations of Polish minority and become ex-
tremely skeptical about Aleksander Łukaszenka and kolkhoz. Others change the iden-
tity and transform in Belarusian-Catholics, however the nature of their transformation 
is up for discussion. They interpret it as a return to their authentic identity: “we have 
always been Belarusian Catholics, but we had a false consciousness of being Polish 
kolkhoznicks”. According to this point of view, Catholicism refers to a certain ide-
ology, like all other confessions: Orthodox, Baptist, or that of Old-believers. These 
Belarusian Catholics are usually extreme opponents of Łukaszenka and kolkhozes, 
and strong activists of opposition to the current regime.
The case of Orthodox in Poland
The situation of Orthodox in the Białystok region is similar. (Being Orthodox is not 
tantamount to believe in Orthodox dogmas – one can be Orthodox non-believer, Or-
thodox atheist or even Ortohox convert (“przechrzta”), i.e. Catholic or Jew.). In the 
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light of data of census made by Orthodox Church, in Białystok in 1980, 332 500 peo-
ple in Bialostoczyzna (Białystok region) are Orthodox. Metropolitan Counsel of The 
Polish Orthodox Church estimates that more than 100 thousand Orthodox people in 
Poland live in mixed marriages. Probably, a bulk of them got married in Catholic 
Church, and that is why they have not been counted as Orthodox. Assuming that these 
data should be reduced because of demographic tendency unfavorable to the Ortho-
dox population, we can suppose that not less than 300 thousand Orthodox people live 
in the district of Białystok. That is the number of Belarusians as well because terms 
“Orthodox” and “Belarus” seem to be synonymous1.
 While there are 1,200 thousand people living in Białystok region, we can assume, 
that 25% of them are Orthodox, that is Belarusians. However, according to the last 
census, only 47,700 people from Voivodship of Podlasie declared themselves to be 
Belarusians. This shocking data was interpreted as a result of fear of discrimination 
or necessity of hiding “the true nationality”. Yet this explanation seems incredible. 
Most Belarusians live in relatively small communities where people know each other 
and the hiding of national or religious identity makes no sense. The alternative inter-
pretation, that explains the phenomenon by a progressive assimilation into the Polish 
identity, is not satisfactory either. In my opinion, the reason is both more simple and 
more complicated. Orthodox people living in region of Białystok consider themselves 
to be the members of the Polish political commonwealth, but the “symbolic universe” 
they live in is still the Orthodox one. If we consider their attitude towards events 
like the declaration of independence of Kosovo, the NATO‘s invasion of Serbia in 
1999 or Anti-Russian campaign in Polish media, we find more reasons supporting 
my hypothesis. Also political preferences of Orthodox people, popularly known as 
Belarusians, cast light on the subject. In the 1991 parliamentary election, only 4,500 
Belarusians voted on the Belarusian Electoral Committee, and 13 thousand support-
ed the Orthodox Electoral Committee. Majority of Belarusian voted on SLD (or the 
“post-communist left”) and the situation repeated in next elections.
To summarize, the idea of “Belarusian nation” does not appeal to the Orthodox 
people from the Białystok region. I would rather name it their “anti-value”, and the 
nationalistic sentiments popularized by so-called “democratic” opposition in Belarus 
are considered to be the ideological weapon of Catholic Poland, directed against the 
Orthodox Belarus.
Conclusions: the boundary of civilizations
According to classic authors like Spengler or Toynbee, each civilization is a historical 
phenomenon confined in space and time. However, there is another view on civiliza-
tion represented by Braudel, Norbert Elias or Koneczny, defining it as a particular pat-
tern of social and existential organization that could be actualized in different places 
1 Such meaning of the concept of „Belarusian” in the Białystok region is accepted by many authors. See e. g.
Mironowicz, E. 1993. Białorusini w Polsce 1944-1949, Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe; Sa-
dowski, A. 1995. Pogranicze polsko-białoruskie: Tożsamość mieszkańców, Białystok: “Trans Humana”.
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and epochs. Koneczny gives here an example of Jewish civilization, which – “like a 
pest” – dispersed all around the world without respecting natural, ethnical or political 
borders.
Looking at civilization from this angle, we have in mind a center (e.g. Washington, 
Moscow, Pekin) and the waves – as a picture of civilizing influences – running out of 
it. These influences are criss-crossed by the influences of other civilizations, and that 
results in new ideological and political patterns and huge problems of identity as well. 
The bigger split between “symbolic universe” and official national or religious ideol-
ogy is the more serious difficulties we are confronted with. The Whole area of the 
Latin-Byzantin criss-cross – from Barents’ to Adriatic See – is fraught with problems. 
The Balkan conflict is the most spectacular one; yet countries like Ukraine, Belarus 
and others are devastated by cultural and religious tensions that are determined by the 
strife of civilizations. 
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Šiame straipsnyje civilizacijos ribos samprata tyrinėjama pasitelkiant lenkų ir 
baltarusių bei lenkų ir ukrainiečių paribio pavyzdį. Autorius remiasi prielaida, 
keliama daugelio istorikų ir sociologų, esą civilizacijos yra tam tikri kultūri-
niai dariniai, kurių pagrindą sudaro ilgalaikiai simbolinės tvarkos modeliai. Šie 
modeliai yra glaudžiai susiję su atitinkamomis religijomis, tokiomis kaip katali-
kybė ir stačiatikybė, tačiau jie turi lemiamą įtaką civilizacijoms, net jei žmonių 
religingumas nėra gilus. Vakarų krikščionybės ir Rytų krikščionybės modelių 
skirtumai išlieka svarbūs net sekuliarizuotame pasaulyje. Autorius analizuoja, 
kaip šie civilizacijų skirtumai veikia tautinius ir politinius tapatumus bei kaip 
su jais kertasi šalyse, įsikūrusiose ties civilizacijų riba. Jis parodo, kaip simboli-
niai modeliai formuoja katalikų mažumos tapatybę mūsų dienų Baltarusijoje ir 
stačiatikių mažumos tapatybę nūdienėje Lenkijoje. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: civilizacijų riba, etninė mažuma, tautinė tapatybė, sim-
boliniai modeliai, „simbolinė visuma“, religija. 
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